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& Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 309 F.

Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
Plaintiff, a manufacturer and seller of electronic components, entered into a contract with defendant, a similar manufacturer and seller,
whereby plaintiff had the right to and did receive from defendant drawings, instructions, and technical assistance relating to the manufacture
of various models of potentiometers. In return, plaintiff was obliged
to pay royalties as specified, including royalties on models for which
no patent application had been or would be made. Just prior to the
expiration of the contract, defendant requested the return of the drawings and other information as to certain of these models, upon which
all required royalties had been paid. Plaintiff refused to return; the
materials, claiming the right to permanently use them if royalties
would continue to be paid. Plaintiff brought action for a declaratory
judgment as to its rights under the contract, and defendant counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment as to such rights and for an injunction. Upon motions by both parties for summary judgment, plaintiff's
motion was granted in part and denied in part; defendant's motion was
denied. The Federal District Court for the Southern District of New
York held that an agreement whereby a trade secret licensee would pay
royalties on models for which no patent application had been or would
be made would not be enforced, since "enforcement of such an agreement would be contrary to our national patent law and policy."1
The law of trade secrets covers a great variety of industrial and
commercial information. In the Restatement of Torts, there is a broad
recitation of the subject matter that has been protected under the law
of trade secrets:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or
compilation of information which is used in one's business, and
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a
chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials,2 a pattern for a machine or other device, or a
list of customers.
Generally, the owner of a trade secret holds a relative monopoly with
respect only to parties who have a legal relationship with the owner and
who have not discovered the secret independently or by "reverse engi1 Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
2 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
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neering." A trade secret remains secret for an indefinite period of time; 3

however, it is defeasible as soon as the secret is acquired through honest
industry. 4 Trade secrets are enforced under state law, under a variety of
theories: property right,5 express contract,6 implied or quasi-contract,7
confidential relationship,8 and others.9
The Patent Act of 1952 defines the subject matter of patent protection as follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject
to the conditions and requirements of this title.' 0

Thus, many business secrets that may be protected under trade secret
law are not proper subject matter for patents. Novelty and invention
are essential requisites for patentability, because a patent protects
against unlicensed use of the patented device or process, even by one
who discovers it properly through independent research." A patent
grants a limited monopoly by giving the patentee the right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling the patented invention during
the term of the patent, seventeen years. Patents are enforced under federal law.
Generally speaking, both the federal patent law and the common
3 E.g., consider the formula for Coca-Cola.
4 See Milbank, Finders Keepers, Licensors Weepers, 52 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 343 (1970).
5 See Kinkade v. New York Shipbuilding Corp., 21 N.J. 362, 122 A.2d 360 (1956);
Club Razor & Blade Mfg. Corp. v. Bindzsus, 131 N.J. Eq. 283, 25 A.2d 31 (Ch. 1942). ag'd,
133 N.J. Eq. 38, 30 A.2d 31 (Ct. Err. & App. 1943); Pomeroy Ink Co. v. Pomeroy, 77 N.J.
Eq. 293, 78 A. 698 (Ch. 1910); Salomon v. Hertz, 40 N.J. Eq. 400, 2 A. 379 (Ch. 1886).
6 See Irvington Varnish & Insulator Co. v. Van Norde, 138 N.J. Eq. 99, 46 A.2d 201
(Ct. Err. & App. 1946); Stone v. Goss, 65 N.J. Eq. 756, 55 A. 736 (Ct. Err. & App. 1903)
(leading case); Club Razor & Blade Mfg. Corp. v. Bindzsus, 131 N.J. Eq. 283, 25 A.2d 31
(Ch. 1942), aif'd, 133 N.J. Eq. 38, 30 A.2d 31 (Ct. Err. & App. 1943).
7 See Stone v. Goss, 65 N.J. Eq. 756, 55 A. 736 (Ct. Err. & App. 1903) (leading case);
Sun Dial Corp. v. Rideout, 29 N.J. Super. 361, 102 A.2d 90 (App. Div.), ag'd, 16 N.J. 252,
108 A.2d 442 (1954); Golden Cruller & Doughnut Co. v. Manasher, 95 N.J. Eq. 537, 123
A. 150 (Ch. 1923).
8 Compare Irvington Varnish & Insulator Co. v. Van Norde, 138 N.J. Eq. 99, 46 A.2d
201 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946); Club Razor & Blade Mfg. Corp. v. Bindzsus, 131 N.J. Eq. 283,
25 A.2d 31 (Ch. 1942), aff'd, 133 N.J. Eq. 38, 30 A.2d 31 (Ct. Err. & App. 1943) (cases expressly recognizing the trade secret owner's property right) with Vulcan Detinning Co. v.
American Can Co., 72 N.J. Eq. 387, 67 A. 339 (Ct. Err. & App. 1907) (leading case); Stone
v. Goss, 65 N.J. Eq. 756, 55 A. 736 (Ct. Err. & App. 1903); Sun Dial Corp. v. Rideout, 29 N.J.
Super. 361, 102 A.2d 90 (App. Div.), af'd, 16 N.J. 252, 108 A.2d 442 (1954); Carver v. Harr,
132 N.J. Eq. 207, 27 A.2d 895 (Ch. 1942) (cases not alluding to the property right).
9 See Milbank, supra note 4, at 347.
10 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1964).
11 See RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 757 (1939).
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law of trade secrets' of the several states serve to protect similar interests in inventions, but they employ different means: disclosure v.
secrecy.13 The patent monopoly is a reward to the inventor, 14 in accordance with the federal constitutional provision:
The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries. 15
Trade secrets are enforced by the states, on the other hand, mainly because of a general distaste for unscrupulous business practices, 16 and
also because of social values such as security from violence, the right of
privacy, and the expectation of truthfulness. 17 But questions of preemption and the supremacy clause' 8 are always present when both federal law and state law "touch upon" a given area. 19
The leading case on the recognition of a legally protectable interest in a trade secret is Morison v. Moat,20 where the English Court of
Chancery enjoined the use of a recipe for medicines. On appeal the
judgment was affirmed, the court holding that where a party who has a
trade secret employs persons under contract or duty, expressed or implied, those persons cannot gain knowledge of the secret and then set it
up against the employer. 21 The decision in Morison influenced the
course of trade secret law in the United States through the case of Peabody v. Norfolk, 22 where the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
held that one who invents or discovers, and keeps secret, a process of
manufacture, whether a proper subject for a patent or not, has a pro12

Id. at §§ 757-59.

13 See Milbank, supra note 4.

See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
16 See Milbank, supra note 4, at 348.
17 See Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent and
Antitrust Supremacy, 80 Hitv. L. REv. 1432, 1450 (1967).
18 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
19 Congress in 1790 enacted the first federal patent and copyright law, I Stat. 109,
and ever since that time has fixed the conditions upon which patents and copyrights shall be granted . . . . These laws, like other laws of the United States
enacted pursuant to constitutional authority, are the supreme law of the land.
See Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963). When state law touches upon the area
of these federal statutes, it is "familiar doctrine" that the federal policy "may
not be set at naught, or its benefits denied" by the state law. Sola Elec. Co. v.
Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942). This is true, of course, even if the
state law is enacted in the exercise of otherwise undoubted state power.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964).
20 9 Hare 241, 68 Eng. Rep. 492 (V.C. 1851).
21 Morison v. Moat, 21 L.J. Ch. 248 (1852).
22 98 Mass. 452 (1868).
14
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perty right therein, which a court of equity will protect against another
who, in violation of contract and breach of confidence, undertakes to
apply it to his own use, or to disclose it to third persons. 2 As was recently noted:
In the years following the Peabody v. Norfolk decision of
1868, there grew up in the United States, by judicial pronouncement, an extensive body of law upon the protection of trade
secrets. The State courts, in their efforts to elevate the level of
morality in business and foster ethical business practices by the
development of a body of law on unfair competition, gave protection to trade secrets wherever the breach of an implied or an
express obligation to maintain secrecy was found. Almost imperceptibly, the law of "trade secrets" developed to include unpatented inventions, whether or not the unpatented inventions were
actually secretly used in a trade. Thus, State courts enforced contracts in which licenses for the use or practice of unpatented inventions were conditioned upon the payment of royalties, and that
protection was extended to contracts concerning unpatented inventions even where, by nature of the invention, it could not be main24
tained as a trade secret.
Until recently, federal patent law and state trade secret law were
relatively compatible. "What the manufacturer could not protect under
patent law, he could maintain as a trade secret." 25 Then, in 1964, two
Supreme Court cases, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 26 and Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,27 upset the old balance and severely
limited the protection that could be given to unpatented inventions
under state unfair competition law. 28 In both Sears and Cornpco, plaintiffs had secured patents for their products and defendants had copied
the products. Plaintiffs brought suits in the same district court for
patent infringement and unfair competition. The court found the
patents invalid and entered judgments for defendants as to patent infringement, but judgments were entered for plaintiffs as to unfair competition. 29 The judgments were affirmed by the court of appeals;3 0 but

the Supreme Court reversed, holding that because of federal patent
23 Id. at 458.
24 Orenbuch, Trade Secrets and the Patent Laws, 52 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 638, 646 (1970).
25 Milbank, supra note 4, at 344.
26 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
2? 376 US. 234 (1964).

28 See Orenbuch, supra note 24, at 649; Adelman, Trade Secrets and Federal Preemption-The Aftermath of Sears and Compco, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 713 (1967).
29 These decisions of the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
are reported in the cases cited in note 30 inIra.
80 Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963); and Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:564

law a state may not prohibit the copying of an unpatented article, or
award damages for such copying, even if selling the copy was likely to
produce and did produce confusion as to the source. In Sears, Justice
Blacks' wrote:
An unpatentable article, like an article on which the patent has
expired, is in the public domain ....To allow a State by use of
its law of unfair competition to prevent the copying of an article
which represents too slight an advance to be patented would be
to permit the State to block off from the public something which
federal law has said belongs to the public. The result would be
that while federal law grants only 14 or 17 years' protection 'to
genuine inventions, . . . States could allow perpetual protection to
articles too lacking in novelty to merit any patent at all under
federal constitutional standards. This would be too great 2an encroachment on the federal patent system to be tolerated.
In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,33 federal patent law confronted state law
enforcing contracts concerning unpatented inventions, and the Supreme Court further expanded the public domain concept. 84 In Lear,
plaintiff, an inventor, was employed by defendant, a manufacturer of
gyroscopes, under an agreement which provided that although plaintiff's new inventions relating to vertical gyros would become his property, he would license them to defendant on a mutually satisfactory
royalty basis. One year later plaintiff filed a patent application on improvements he had made, and he entered into negotiations with defendant, the result of which was a lengthy licensing agreement relating
to the then pending application. Six years after the application was
filed, a patent was issued on a relatively narrow claim. Meanwhile,
however, defendant, on the basis of its own patentability search, had
ceased making royalty payments to plaintiff. Upon the issuance of his
patent, plaintiff promptly brought suit against defendant in the state
court for breach of the licensing agreement. The case finally reached the
United States Supreme Court on the issue of whether or not a patent
licensee was estopped from challenging the validity of the patent.385 The
31

Justice Black also wrote the opinion in Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting Inc.,

376 U.S. 234 (1964).
32

376 U.S. at 231-32 (emphasis added).

83 395 US. 653 (1969).
84

See Milbank, supra note 4, at 354; Arnold & Goldstein, Life Under Lear, 48

TEXAS

L. REv. 1235 (1970).
35 [Olne of the oldest doctrines in the field of patent law establishes that so long

as a licensee is operating under a license agreement he is estopped to deny the
validity of his licensor's patent in a suit for royalties under the agreement. The
theory underlying this doctrine is that a licensee should not be permitted to

NOTES

Court held that a patent licensee was not estopped from challenging the
validity of the patent, and so buried the already dead licensee estoppel
doctrine, 6 in spite of the demands of the common law of contracts, 7
because the "federal law [of patents] requires that all ideas in general
circulation be dedicated to the common good unless they are protected
by a valid patent."3 8 The Court also held that if the patent was invalid,
the licensee was entitled to avoid payment of all royalties accruing after
the patent had issued. However, the majority refused to allow the licensee to cease making royalty payments prior to the issuance of the patent.8 9 The question was left to the states:
Adkins' claim to contractual royalties accruing before the
1960 patent issued is, however, a much more difficult one, since
it squarely raises the question whether, and to what extent, the
States may protect the owners of unpatented inventions who are
willing to disclose their ideas to manufacturers only upon payment
of royalties. . . . [W]e have concluded, after much consideration,
that even though an important question of federal law underlies
this phase of the controversy, we should not now attempt to define
in even a limited way the extent, if any, to which the States may
properly act to enforce the contractual rights of inventors of unpatented secret ideas. Given the difficulty and importance of this
task, it should be undertaken only after the state courts have,
after fully focused inquiry, determined the extent to which they
40
will respect the contractual rights of such inventors in the future.
In a separate opinion in Lear, Justice White reasoned that the
Court ought not to have dealt at all with the question of whether federal law forbids the collection of royalties which might otherwise be
collectible under a contract rooted in state law. However, Justice
Black's dissent "showed none of the majority's timidity in considering
enjoy the benefit afforded by the agreement while simultaneously urging that
the patent which forms the basis of the agreement is void.
Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 67 Cal. 2d 882, 891, 435 P.2d 321, 325-26, 64 Cal. Rptr. 545, 549-50
(1967).
86 Long before Hazeltine [Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950)] was decided, the estoppel doctrine had been so
eroded that it could no longer be considered the "general rule," but was only
to be invoked in an ever-narrowing set of circumstances.
395 U.S. at 664.
37 [T]he law of contracts forbids a purchaser to repudiate his promises simply
because he later becomes dissatisfied with the bargain he has made.
395 US. at 668.
38 Id. (emphasis added).
39 See Milbank, supra note 4, at 356.
40 395 US. at 674-75.
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question."' 41

this
With Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas concurring, Justice Black wrote:
I still entertain the belief I expressed for the Court in Stiffel
and Compco that no State has a right to authorize any kind of
monopoly on what is claimed to be a new invention, except when
a patent has been obtained from the Patent Office under the exacting standards of the patent laws. One who makes a discovery may,
of course, keep it secret if he wishes, but private arrangements
under which self-styled "inventors" do not keep their discoveries
secret, but rather disclose them, in return for contractual payments, run counter to the plan of our patent laws, which tightly
regulate the kind of inventions that may be protected and the manner in which they may be protected. The national policy expressed
in the patent laws, favoring free competition and narrowly limiting monopoly, cannot be frustrated by private agreements among
individuals, with or without the approval of the State. 42
In Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., the United States district court
appeared to respond to the challenge of the Supreme Court by echoing
the dissent of Justice Black in Lear:
[T]his court holds that federal patent law requires an inventor to
submit his ideas to the Patent 4 Office
before he can compel con3
sideration for the use of his idea.

The court's rationale was given in the opinion of Judge Motley:
Our patent policy of strict regulation of inventions would be
undercut if inventors could enforce agreements for compensation
for alleged secret ideas without being required to submit those
ideas to the Patent Office, and, thereby, eventually have the ideas
disclosed to the public. Furthermore, patent policy (reaffirmed by
the holding in Lear that estoppel will not be a bar to challenging
the validity of a patent .. .) which allows compensation only for
ideas which rise to the level of invention would be further undermined by the enforcement of such a contract, since compensation
would be awarded for non-inventions. 44
It is submitted that the judgment in Painton, now being appealed,
should be reversed, and the question as to whether federal patent law
and policy require a patent application as a prerequisite to licensing a
trade secret for royalties, be answered in the negative.
The holding in Painton was based solely upon the court's consideration of Lear. But Lear was concerned only with ideas in "general cirMilbank, supra note 4, at 358.
42 395 U.S. at 677.
48 509 F. Supp. at 274.
41

44

Id.
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culation. ' '45 An applicant for a patent discloses his invention to the
public immediately upon issuance of the patent. Hence, a patentee's
ideas are in "general circulation," whether or not his patent is challenged or unchallenged, valid or invalid. Similarly, Sears and Compco
were concerned with articles in the "public domain,"4 6 i.e., ideas in
"general circulation." However, in Painton, the licensor's ideas were
not in "general circulation." It is strongly urged that as long as ideas
are not placed in "general circulation," they do not fall within the ambit of federal patent law or policy.
There is also the rule that pending patent applications are preserved in secrecy by the Patent Office; abandoned and rejected applications are likewise not open to public inspection.4 7 Thus, ideas which
are not patented and which may fall short of the "exacting standards of
the patent laws, ' '48 are treated as trade secrets under the federal patent
laws. Ideas which are not submitted to the Patent Office should not be
treated any differently. Otherwise, the Patent Office would be burdened
with considering every idea which may be a subject of a licensing agreement.
The Painton holding had been anticipated:
If Black would not allow the inventor protection during the application period, he certainly would oppose state protection of an
inventor who had never applied for a patent. The great weakness
of Black's dissent [in Lear] is that he fails49to recognize the legal
and economical implications of his position.
Under Black's dissent in Lear, and now under Painton, an inventor is
not to be protected as a trade secret licensor prior to the issuance of a
patent. Therefore, he will not license his invention before that time.
However, an inventor is never sure of the "true" patentability of his
invention until his patent is challenged in the courts; that is, his patent
is still conditional on a judicial determination of validity. 0 If his patent
is declared invalid, which is often the case, then, under Lear, the licensee can avoid payment of all royalties accruing after the patent had
issued, and the inventor would receive nothing for his innovative effort.
As has been recently stated:
It is unlikely that American industry would invest more than $15
45
46
47
48
49

395 US. at 668.
376 U.S. at 231.
37 C.F.R. § 1.14 (Supp. 1970).
395 U.S. at 677.
Milbank, supra note 4, at 358.

5o In the United States there exists a statutory presumption of patent validity; however, the presumption is rebuttable, 35 U.S.C. § 282 (Supp. V, 1970).

572

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

billion dollars in research and development annually if the uncertain and erratic protection of the patent laws were the sole assurance of return on investment. 5 '
Irwin M. Krittman
51 R.

MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS

§ 6.05 (1970).

